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Abstract 
In accordance with “Democracy’s Effect on Development: More Questions than Answers”, we 
seek to carry out a study in following the description in the ‘Questions for Further Study.’ To 
that end, we studied 33 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, who all went through an 
election which should signal a “step-up” for their democracy, one in which previously 
homogenous regimes transfer power to an opposition party that fairly won the election. After 
doing so, liberal-democracy indicators and democracy indicators were evaluated in the five years 
prior to and after the election took place, and over that ten-year period we examine the data for 
trends. If we see positive or negative trends over this time horizon, we be able to conclude that it 
was the recent increase in the quality of their democracy which lead to it. Having investigated 
examples of this in depth, there seems to be three main archetypes which drive the results. 
Countries with positive results to their democracy from the election have generally positive 
effects on their development, countries with more “plateau” like results also did well, but 
countries for whom the descent to authoritarianism was continued by this election found more 
negative results.  
Keywords:  Democracy, Development, V-Dem, WDI, World Bank, Calculus, Mixed-N 
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The Calculus of Democratization and Development 
In investigating the causal relationship between democracy and development, a field of 
mathematics which seems likely to contain answers the answers we need would be calculus. In 
calculus, we are primarily concerned with the change in a given variable over another variable. 
For us those variables are our democracy and development indicators, and the other variable will 
always be time. To that end, when we examine the derivative of the linear approximation of the 
data, at the point we care about, the election, should be able to use that information to make 
some sort of assertion about the causal link between democracy and development, or the lack 
thereof. In our investigation we have found that democracies undergo this democratic transition 
in a number of archetypal modes. The three most important found in our investigation were 
“Election Plateau,” “Slope Down,” and “Step Up.” Amongst these we selected one country from 
each of those three archetypes to examine in detail, Niger, Benin, and Zimbabwe.  
Methodology 
In the analysis of the countries of the SSA region, we first collected the relevant variables 
for examination from the World Bank’s WDI dataset and V-Dem’s datasets. Then, once all the 
data we would need was properly added, we continued by identifying countries which underwent 
their first peaceful democratic transition of executive power after, on average, 1963. Next, the 
countries had their democracy and development indices evaluated over time, specifically the 5 
years before and 5 years after the key election. Then, a linear regression was applied to the data, 
and that linear regression was used to determine the trend about the transition date. Originally, 
we expected to find that all the countries in our study would exhibit the “step up” archetype, but 
as it turns out, sometimes, those transitions either empowered new authoritarians or did not affect 
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long term change, as the newly elected government was later removed in some sort of 
authoritarian coup. 
Literature Review 
In examining the current state of consensus on this issue amongst political scientists, it is 
imperative that we better restrict our focus specifically to the casual links existence and 
directionality, as this is the area we are most concerned with in this study. According to Olson’s 
1993 piece, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” while authoritarianism is preferable 
to anarchy, the individual rights guaranteed by a strong, sustaining, liberal democracy are 
necessary to maximize private investment and economic growth. Clearly then, it seems that 
Olsen is amenable to the idea that democracy is a causal factor in development in countries, 
especially when it comes to seeing countries reach their full economic and quality of life 
potential. Shihata’s 1997 piece, “Democracy and Development” again sheds light on this subject, 
summarizing much of the World Bank’s observations on the matter, which seem to find it 
difficult to qualify claims of causality in either direction. Hopefully, this is where my research 
can shed some light on the subject. Still, even Shihata must eventually concede that, more often 
than not, democracies show stronger development. The main outlier amongst the literature 
reviewed was certainly the piece by Przeworski, Limongi, and Giner, “Political Regimes and 
Economic Growth.” In this piece, they attack the issue from a different position, they begin at a 
simple point of agreement amongst the majority of the political science community; property 
rights are critical and causal to development and growth in a country. Then, they proceed via a 
new question, “Does democracy or authoritarianism better provide for property rights?” 
Surprisingly, and unfortunately for a pro-democracy point of view, Przeworski et al. found that 
Authoritarianism was better at properly insulating against the pressure for immediate 
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consumption, which would hinder overall investment. While one can easily envision possible 
ways to refute the findings of Przeworski et al, even if their findings are true as long as the other 
benefits of democracy outweigh the negative effects on property rights that Przeworski et al. cite, 
then we would still expect our findings to consistent with the majority, that democracy is 
generally beneficial to development. While most of the papers reviewed hinted at the democracy 
causing development link, nearly all acknowledged that the other direction was certainly also 
existent. Often, authors made mention of the need to reach certain development thresholds to be 
ready for a democracy, especially a sustainable democracy (Shihata 1997). Overall, while it 
seems clear that the fact that development is often necessary for democracy, it is the question of 
whether democracy leads to development that is currently the most ripe and ready for 
examination, since consensus on the topic is mostly weak. 
Large N – the 33 SSA Countries 
As we discussed above all previously examined SSA countries were evaluated for 
whether they would have a first ever election turnover in a time frame in which sufficient WDI 
data existed to conduct our analysis. That left us with a large N of 33 suitable countries, some of 
which became insignificant later in the investigation. Amongst those we began to divide the 
countries up by the response their liberal democracy index had to the election. While numerous 
archetypes existed, “Election Plateau,” “Election Spike,” “Hockey Stick,” “Slope Down,” “Slope 
Up,” “Step Down,” Step Up,” only three were selected as important enough for further study. 
Those three were “Election Plateau,” “Slope Down,” and “Step Up,” and each represents a 
different story, and result for authoritarianism and democracy in their country. 
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Election Plateau 
The Election Plateau is the most interesting of the three archetypes we found in our study. While 
one might expect that these power transferring elections would result in increases in the liberal 
democracy indexes of those countries involved, hat we found instead was that for some 
countries, the election was just the exchange of one parties chosen dictator for another. For these 
countries, while they often experienced overall GDP losses, often these new regimes were able to 
rally the country to new GDP growth heights and better international trade. These results give 
our conclusions the greatest trouble, because while the election represented a surge in liberal 
democracy, it appears that after that surge the country retreated back to authoritarianism, without 
most of the detriment that might seem to imply. It may likely take extensive further investigation 
whether the positive effects were felt because of the democratic surge, or from the stabilizing 
retreat of liberal democracy. 
Slope Down 
The slope down indicates a dismissal of liberal democracy before, during, and after the key 
election. The development of country seems untenable by the administration that continues, 
unchanged, the countries path to authoritarianism. One of the most interesting trends identified, 
was that when the GDPs of slope down countries showed a negative trend, their GDP growth 
was positive. And, when the GDP of those countries trends positive, their GDP growth suffered. 
This would seem to imply that when an authoritarian regime takes control of a strong economy 
turning bad, it is within their power to improve it. But, when inheriting a weak economy 
experiencing a growth, they seem incapable of making that better. This is promising if, as 
democrats, we would like to see authoritarian regimes be less competent in effecting positive 
change in development factors than democracies.  
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Step Up 
The step up countries exemplify what we should hope to see in the event of a true democratic 
transition. The election represented a clear slope up in the liberal democracy index of the 
country, where the country then stabilizes at a higher level of liberal democracy. Luckily for us, 
our results seem conducive to the idea that democracies promote development. Step up countries 
tend to show positive trends in GDP and GDP growth. More often than not, they also see positive 
trends in primary education completion amongst relevant age groups. This one of the hall mark 
findings of our study, because while counter examples exist, the majority of step up countries 
show marked improvements in development as a result of this step up in liberal democracy. This 
does open up further questions, but give us the best most direct answer to the question between 
democracy and development to date. 
Small N Analysis 
In following up our examination of the three archetypes we select three key cases to 
further examine to better understand the phenomena underlying the democratic transitions in 
those nations. To that end, we select the countries of Niger, Benin, and Zimbabwe. Niger 
exemplifies the election plateau archetype, showing off how despite a negative GDP trend, all 
other variables analyzed experienced positive reactions to the temporary boost in liberal 
democracy indices. Benin exemplifies the slope down archetype, where having inherited a weak 
economy growing stronger, the GDP growth trend is negative, implying that the administration is 
failing to secure actual growth to policy. Zimbabwe, exemplifies the step up archetype, in which 
strong growth of in real GDP per capita and in the growth rate of their GDP shows honest 
improvements. Zimbabwe’s development improvements speak to their improved liberal 
democracy and how it leads to greater development.  
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Niger 
 
Figure 1.1 
Niger shows how under an election plateau condition a country can experience an overall growth 
in GDP per capita, but suffer from a negative trend in GDP growth.  As we have previously seen, 
while more 
democratic 
countries tend to 
have more 
development, the 
extenuating 
circumstances of 
election plateau 
countries cast that 
knowledge into doubt. Niger had troubles from the start, from its independence in 1958, it 
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struggled to gain a 
solid democratic 
standing.  In its first 
14 years, it existed 
as a single party 
civilian regime 
under the then 
president, Hamani 
Diori (Idrissa & 
Decalo 2012). Then, the military, displeased with the actions of the ruling regime in response to 
an ongoing drought along with plentiful accusations of corruption, seized power through a coup 
and instated the first military rule of Niger. While the Supreme Military Council did release the 
political prisoners of President Diori, they instituted numerous other crack downs on democracy 
and liberty, banning political parties and harshly ending and punishing attempted coups. Finally, 
after stable but meager economic growth, in 1989 a referendum created the second republic, 
which was notable for its liberalization of the legal system, and the release of all previous 
political prisoners. Though, key to the transition of post-independence Niger, the 1991 National 
Severing Conference opened up the country into a multi-party democracy, and became the third 
republic. It was followed not long after by another military coup, which seized power given the 
unacceptable gridlock perceived by the public in this new multi-party system. Therefore, we’re 
left with the case in Niger between 1989-1998, from the first democratic transfer of power in 
1993, to the later coup in 1996, the democratic government was woefully underequipped to make 
substantive change in that three-year period. In this sense we begin to understand the key point 
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that makes election plateau countries similar, the elected government lacked the sufficient time 
and power to affect real change, and was ejected before democracy could truly grow. In Niger, 
we found a standard example of the story of election plateau countries, short rules which resulted 
in no significant change to democracy or development. 
Benin 
 
Figure 2.1 
Benin exemplifies the slope down archetype, various failed coups and multiple seizures of power 
have plagued the administration with a crippling inability to make meaningful change or to 
invest properly in the development of the country. This is the story of slope down countries, 
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failures and falling 
further and further 
into 
authoritarianism.  
This again lends 
credence to the idea 
that 
authoritarianism has 
an inverse causal 
link to development. Before 1960, Benin was under French colonial rule. While there was 
certainly investment in infrastructure, French colonialism in Africa focused on assimilation 
through education and culture, not through actual marriages between ethnic French and local 
populations (Betts 2006).  This meant that while some infrastructure was developed, since few 
ethnic French lived 
there, less ‘foreign’ 
wealth and 
development was 
brought in. Then, in 
1960, The country 
received its 
independence, and 
spent the next 
decade between various failed elections and military coups. Obviously, in this chaotic, nearly 
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anarchic state, very little investment or development existed to support the country. While, 
overall GDP may have grown, the negative trend in GDP growth reveals how the lack of 
oversight, protections for private property, and general safety reveals how the lack of effective 
democracy has adverse effects on overall development. In Benin, as the country’s leadership 
falters so too does the countries development indices. As the complications around the elections 
in the years immediately following independence unfolded, we saw serious adverse effects in the 
liberal democracy index and development scores of the country. Because of our restricted 
timeframe, We should likely be able to attribute the GDP per capita to independence, but the 
negative trend in the much more fickle and temporal GDP growth metric were likely caused by 
the transitions away from democracy. 
Zimbabwe 
 
Figure 3.1 
Zimbabwe is truly the poster child for the study. While the transfer of power in the case studied 
was from colonial to independent power, it still represented a significant increase in their liberal 
democracy score, and saw marked improvements in GDP per capita and GDP growth as a result. 
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As the country celebrated its new-found independence, the surge towards democracy drove 
development, and brought about improvements in numerous sectors of the economy and public 
interest.  During the 
celebrations, the 
then president of 
Nigeria, Shehu 
Shagari, pledged 
$15 million for the 
training of 
Zimbabweans, with 
the majority of 
those funds supporting students in university (Kalley, Schoeman and Andor 1999). This kind of 
strong foreign investment, coupled with strong protections for private property fueled the 
lighting growth of 
post-independence 
Zimbabwe. Overall, 
the first few years 
of Zimbabwe’s 
independence were 
characterized by 
general unity, 
cohesion, and it 
tend to enjoy the benefits of a strong liberal democracy, mostly through its unity against the 
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remnants of British rule rather than real institutional protections of freedoms. While Zimbabwe’s 
independence story is not necessarily the norm, the trend it represents for step up democratic 
transitions seems clear, improvements in the administration and adherence to democracy seem to 
more often than not show similar improvements in developments. Later, partisanship, ethnic 
divisions, and general disunity would fracture the country and mean that more institutional 
progress was required to better ensure the continued success of the country, but in the short term, 
immediately following independence and the election of the first independent president, the 
Zimbabwe saw numerous, concrete benefits to its development.  
Conclusion 
In the end, we found numerous archetypes in the liberal democracy indices, but three 
amongst them had the greatest relevance to our question. First, election plateau helped us learn 
more about the nuances of transitions to democracy and their effects on development. The results 
of the studies of election plateau countries showed that even in the short term, there are some 
benefits to development from democracy, but the fall back into authoritarianism often 
counteracted much of the benefits gained in the short term, and nullified the possibility of long 
term benefit. The second, slope down, showed us how authoritarianism often led to negative 
results in development, for numerous factors. Finally, the last major archetype, step up, showed 
us the benefits of strengthening liberal democracy on development, though it was difficult to 
more accurately say which methodologies exactly lead top the benefits democracy displays. 
Overall, what we found from analyzing these three most indicative archetypes of democratic 
transitions, was that democracy does appear to lead to increased development. Unfortunately 
though, the underlying reasons for this have not been clearly shown by this study and numerous 
questions remain ripe for further analysis. 
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